

Clearing Prices of Unforced Capacity may differ from location to location. If no locational constraints are binding (i.e., if the limitations on the total amount of Unforced Capacity that can be sold from any given Control Area did not force the NYISO to select more expensive offers of Unforced Capacity in the auction than it would have selected in the absence of those locational constraints), then the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity will be the same at every location.

When locational constraints do not bind, the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity in a given Capability Period or Monthly Auction will be the marginal offer price ("Marginal Offer Price") of providing additional Unforced Capacity in such Monthly Auction or Capability Period Auction, as applicable. This procedure for calculating Market-Clearing Prices is analogous to the procedure that will be used to calculate LBMP prices in the Energy market (which are based upon the marginal bid cost of supplying an increment of Load at a location). Illustrations of these procedures for calculating prices appear in [Attachment H](#) of this *ICAP Manual*.

In order to determine the Marginal Offer Price of providing Unforced Capacity in the Capability Period and Monthly Auction, the NYISO will calculate the change in the amount of Unforced Capacity that would have been bought and sold by each Bidder and Offeror if there had been — in addition to the Bids and offers that were already part of the auction — an additional demand for a very small amount of Unforced Capacity. The presence of this additional demand would have had one of two effects. Either it would have increased the amount of Unforced Capacity purchased from the marginal Offeror (which is the Offeror whose offer price is lowest among those entities that offered Unforced Capacity into that auction, but did not sell all of that Unforced Capacity in that auction), so that the amount of Unforced Capacity purchased from that Offeror would have been slightly above the amount that was actually purchased in that auction. Alternatively, it would have decreased the amount of Unforced Capacity purchased by the marginal Bidder (which is the Bidder whose bid price is lowest among those entities that purchased Unforced Capacity in that auction), so that the amount of Unforced Capacity purchased by that Bidder would have been slightly below the amount that was actually purchased in that auction (with the leftover Unforced Capacity used to meet the small additional demand). The algorithm that the NYISO uses to conduct the Capability Period or Monthly Auction will choose whichever of these mechanisms satisfies the additional demand at the lowest cost. That cost (expressed in terms of \$/kW per time period applicable to the auction) will determine the Marginal Offer Price of providing Unforced Capacity in that auction.

When a locational constraint is binding, the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity at ~~each the~~ location in either the Capability Period or Monthly Auction, as applicable, will still be the Marginal Offer Price of providing additional Unforced Capacity in either the Capability Period or Monthly Auction, as applicable, but it will be the Marginal Offer Price of providing Unforced Capacity at the location of the locational constraint.

First, the locational constraints will be divided into two groups. A Locality constraint is binding if the NYISO selects offers of Unforced Capacity located in a certain Locality while not selecting lower-priced offers of Unforced Capacity from outside that Locality. The only instance in which the NYISO will not select such offers only do this is in order to avoid violating locational constraints specified by Bidders-Installed Capacity Suppliers that



state that a ~~Bid~~ an offer is only valid for Unforced Capacity located in a given Locality. ~~A Locality constraint will also be binding for the New York City Locality if the NYISO does not select lower priced offers of Unforced Capacity from the New York City Locality, but instead selects higher priced offers of Unforced Capacity in the New York City Locality or elsewhere. The NYISO will only select such higher priced offers in order to avoid violating the limitation on sales of In City generation that is subject to capacity market mitigation measures.~~

An External Control Area constraint is binding if the NYISO does not select offers of Unforced Capacity located in a particular External Control Area (or group of Areas), while selecting offers with higher offer prices from Installed Capacity Suppliers located in the NYCA or in other External Control Areas, ~~or~~ to avoid violating the limits on the total amount of Unforced Capacity that can be sold from a given External Control Area (or group of Areas), pursuant to Section 4.9.3 of this *ICAP Manual*. When the only unawarded offers for Unforced Capacity at an External Control Area interface are associated with External Capacity Resource Interconnection Service (CRIS) Rights offers by an Installed Capacity Supplier whose Unforced Capacity obligation has been met, such offers (i.e., the Unforced Capacity in excess of the External CRIS Right obligation) will not be considered in determining the Market Clearing Price at the External Interface, and the External Control Area constraint is not deemed to be binding for purposes of setting the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity.

~~Then~~ The Market-Clearing Price in a Locality or External Control Area is determined as follows:

- If a Locality constraint is binding in a Capability Period or Monthly Auction, the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity located in that Locality will be the Marginal Offer Price of providing additional Unforced Capacity in that Locality in that auction.
- If an External Control Area constraint is binding for a particular Control Area (or group of Areas) in a Capability Period or Monthly Auction, then the Market-Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity located in that External Control Area (or group of Areas) will be the Marginal Offer Price of providing additional Unforced Capacity from that particular External Control Area (or group of Areas).
- The Market-Clearing Price in ~~an~~ a Capability Period or Monthly auction for Unforced Capacity located in Rest of State (which includes (1) Unforced Capacity located in the NYCA, but not in any other Locality; (2) Unforced Capacity located in a Locality, if that Locality constraint is not binding; and (3) Unforced Capacity located in an External Control Area, if no External Control Area constraint affecting that External Control Area (or group of Areas) is binding) will be the Marginal Offer Price of providing additional Unforced Capacity located anywhere other than a Locality for which a Locality constraint is binding or an External Control Area (or group of Areas) for which an External Control Area constraint is binding.

The set of prices that result will ensure that when a Long Island Locality constraint is binding, the Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity located in that Locality will be higher than the Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity located in the portion of the

NYCA that is not part of another Locality. It also ensures that when an External Control Area constraint is binding, the Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity located in that External Control Area (or group of Areas) will be lower than the Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity located in the portion of the NYCA that is not part of another Locality.

The NYISO will identify Bids that are accepted as follows:

1. Bids for Unforced Capacity that must be located in a Locality that were above the Market-Clearing Price for that Locality will be accepted in their entirety. Bids equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.
2. Bids for Unforced Capacity that could be located anywhere in the NYCA that were above the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State will be accepted in their entirety. Bids equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.
3. Bids for Unforced Capacity that could be located anywhere in the NYCA or in one or more External Control Areas that were above the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State will be accepted in their entirety. Bids equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.

The NYISO will identify offers that are accepted as follows:

1. Offers for Unforced Capacity in a Locality that were below the Market-Clearing Price for that Locality will be accepted in their entirety. Offers equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.
  - a. An exception applies to Unforced Capacity associated with In-City generation that is not subject to capacity market mitigation measures. Offers for such Unforced Capacity shall be accepted if they are below either the Market-Clearing Price for the New York City Locality or the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State, whichever is higher. Offers equal to the greater of the Market-Clearing Price for the New York City Locality or the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State shall be accepted on a pro rata basis.
2. Offers for Unforced Capacity in Rest of State that were below the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State will be accepted in their entirety. Offers equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.
3. Offers for Unforced Capacity in an External Control Area that were below the Market-Clearing Price for that External Control Area will be accepted in their entirety. Bids equal to the Market-Clearing Price will be accepted on a pro rata basis.

Market-Clearing Prices will be calculated independently within each Capability Period and Monthly Auction. As a result, the Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity at a given location may vary within the same auction, or among different monthly auctions conducted at the same time.

### 5.15.2 ICAP Spot Market Auction

In the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the NYISO will construct a supply curve for the total Unforced Capacity in the NYCA for which the NYISO receives offers, which includes all Capacity that LSEs or Installed Capacity Suppliers had designated for use to meet their

respective LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations through self-supply, as well as all other Capacity offered into the ICAP Spot Market Auction. In cases in which the total amount of Capacity in a given External Control Area, or the combination of all External Control Areas, would exceed limits on the amount of Capacity that can be located in these areas, the NYISO shall eliminate the highest offers (or parts of those offers) in the affected External Control Areas from this supply curve until those limits are no longer exceeded.

If prior to a Spot Market Auction the sum of External CRIS MW and Import Rights granted at an interface with an External Control Area is equal to the interface limit as defined in Section 4.9.6 of this *ICAP Manual* (i.e., the interface is full), offers for MW of Unforced Capacity that are not associated with External CRIS or Import Rights will be rejected.

In the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the NYISO will also construct a supply curve for all Unforced Capacity offered for each Locality which includes all Capacity in that Locality that LSEs or Installed Capacity Suppliers had designated for use to meet their respective LSE Unforced Capacity Obligations through self-supply, as well as all other Capacity in that Locality offered into the ICAP Spot Market Auction. Capacity combined with UDRs shall be treated as Capacity in the relevant Locality.

In the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the Market-Clearing Price shall be determined for the NYCA, for each Locality, and for each External Control Area. The Market-Clearing Price for the NYCA will be the price at which the supply curve for the total Unforced Capacity intersects the applicable ICAP Demand Curve for the total Installed Capacity market, subject to applicable constraints. The Market-Clearing Price for a Locality will be the price at which the supply curve for that Locality intersects the Demand Curve for that Locality unless the Market-Clearing Price determined for Rest of State is higher in which case the Market-Clearing Price for that Locality will be set at the Market-Clearing Price for Rest of State.

The Market-Clearing Price for an External Control Area will be set to the Market-Clearing Price for the NYCA unless there were offers below the NYCA Market-Clearing Price from Installed Capacity Suppliers in External Control Areas that were not accepted. If a received offer in the ICAP Spot Market Auction was not accepted because it would cause the limit on the total amount of Capacity provided by Installed Capacity Suppliers located outside the NYCA to have been exceeded, the Market-Clearing Price for all External Control Areas shall be set to the price at which one could have obtained an incremental amount of Capacity from anywhere outside the NYCA unless there were offers below such Market-Clearing Price from Installed Capacity Suppliers in a given External Control Area that were not accepted. In that case, the Market-Clearing Price for that External Control Area would be set to the price at which one could have obtained an incremental amount of Capacity in that External Control Area. If the only unawarded offers for Unforced Capacity at that External Control Area interface are associated with External Capacity Resource Interconnection Service (CRIS) Rights offers by an Installed Capacity Supplier whose Unforced Capacity obligation has been met, such offers (i.e., the Unforced Capacity in excess of the External CRIS Right obligation) will not be considered in determining the Market Clearing Price at that External interface.

No later than the fifth (5th) business day following the date that the NYISO posts the ICAP Spot Market Auction results, for all Special Case Resources in Zone J, each RIP shall

1. The Market-Clearing Price for the Locality times the number of MW of offers they submitted that were accepted for Capacity in that Locality. (Capacity combined with UDRs will be treated as Capacity in the relevant Locality.)
2. The Market-Clearing Price for the NYCA times the number of MW of offers they submitted that were accepted.
3. The Market-Clearing Price for an External Control Area times the number of MW of offers they submitted that were accepted for Capacity in that External Control Area.

In the ICAP Spot Market Auction, the NYISO will ~~pay~~<sup>charge</sup> entities purchasing Unforced Capacity the Market-Clearing Price as determined in Section 5.15 of this *ICAP Manual*.

Settlements for all Installed Capacity auctions will occur in the month following the month for which the Unforced Capacity was purchased. For example, Unforced Capacity purchased for the month of May will be billed and paid for in the month of June. The schedule for bills and payments for Unforced Capacity will follow the Energy Market schedule. A timetable for bills and payments for the Energy Market can be found on the NYISO Web site: ([www.nyiso.com](http://www.nyiso.com)).

Unforced Capacity purchased in the six-month strip auction (the Capability Period Auction) will be settled on a monthly basis. The NYISO will issue bills for one-sixth of the applicable Market-Clearing Price for Unforced Capacity on the same schedule referenced above.

## 5.17 Allocation of Winning Bids

In the Capability Period and Monthly Auctions, each Bidder whose Bid to purchase Unforced Capacity is selected will be allocated a pro rata share of the Unforced Capacity purchased in the auction using the following procedure:


1. Bidders whose Bids specified that the Unforced Capacity must be associated with an Installed Capacity Supplier located in a Locality will be awarded such Unforced Capacity.
2. Any remaining purchasers of Unforced Capacity shall be allocated capacity provided by all remaining sellers of Unforced Capacity on a pro-rata basis.

## 5.18 Posting of Results

The NYISO will post the results of each auction within the time period specified in the NYISO Procedures. These results shall include:

1. The Market-Clearing Price for each Locality, each External Control Area, and the portion of the NYCA not included in any other Locality, in each NYISO-administered auction.
2. The total amount of Unforced Capacity associated with Installed Capacity Suppliers in each Locality, each External Control Area, and the portion of the

NYCA that is not included in any other Locality that was sold in each NYISO-administered auction.

3. The total amount of Unforced Capacity purchased in each NYISO-administered auction, broken down by the constraints placed upon the location of that Unforced Capacity by the Bidders placing those Bids. 

The NYISO shall publish all Bids and Offers made in each auction ~~six~~-three months after the conclusion of that auction. The names of Offerors or Bidders will not be revealed publicly; however, the NYISO will post these data in a way that permits the identity of a given Offeror or Bidder to be tracked over time.

## 6. SANCTIONS

The NYISO may impose sanctions on Installed Capacity Suppliers, LSEs, and Transmission Owners for failing to comply with requirements set forth in the *NYISO Services Tariff* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL:

[http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)) and requirements enumerated in this *ICAP Manual*.

Sanctions may be assessed against Installed Capacity Suppliers for actions that fall into the following two categories:

- Failure to provide required information; and
- Failure to comply with bidding, scheduling and notification requirements, and procedures.

An LSE that fails to comply with the ISO's requirement to demonstrate ahead of an Obligation Procurement Period that it has procured sufficient Unforced Capacity to cover its Minimum Unforced Capacity Requirement is penalized through the procedures and financial consequences of the Deficiency Procurement Auction. Please refer to Section 5 of this *ICAP Manual* for details.

A Transmission Owner that fails to provide the information required by Section 5.11.3 of the *NYISO Service Tariff* in a timely fashion is subject to sanctions as described below in Section 6.2 of this *ICAP Manual*. The *NYISO Services Tariff* references are Sections 5.11.3, 5.12.1, 5.12.12, and 5.14.1.

### 6.1 Supplier Sanctions

Supplier sanctions are set forth in the NYISO Services Tariff.

#### 6.1.1 Failure to Provide Required Information

~~Section 4 of this *ICAP Manual*, and the detailed timeline that can be found by selecting the link provided (<http://www.nyiso.com/public/products/icap/index.jsp>), contain detailed descriptions of the types of information that Installed Capacity Suppliers must provide to the NYISO, and the deadlines for receipt of that information.~~

~~With the exception of a failure to comply with Subsection 5.12.1.5 of the *NYISO Services Tariff* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL: [http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)), the NYISO may take the following actions if an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to provide the required information in a timely fashion:~~

- ~~On the first day that the required information is late (unless that day falls on a weekend or official New York State holiday, in which case the notification shall be made on the next business day), the NYISO shall notify the Installed Capacity Supplier that the information is past due and that the NYISO reserves the right to~~

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~~impose financial sanctions if the information is not provided by the end of the next day.~~

- ~~▪ Starting on the third day that the required information is late, the NYISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to the higher of \$500 or \$5 per MW of Unforced Capacity that the Installed Capacity Supplier is capable of providing.~~
- ~~▪ Starting on the tenth day that the required information is late, the NYISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to the higher of \$1000 or \$10 per MW of Unforced Capacity that the Installed Capacity Supplier is capable of providing.~~

~~If an Installed Capacity Supplier fails to provide information required by Subsection 5.12.1.5 of the NYISO Services Tariff in a timely fashion, the NYISO may take the following actions:~~

- ~~▪ On the first day that the required information is late, the NYISO shall notify the Installed Capacity Supplier that required information is past due and that it reserves the right to impose financial sanctions if the information is not provided by the end of that first calendar day; and~~
- ~~▪ Starting on the second calendar day that the required information is late, the NYISO may impose a daily financial sanction up to the higher of \$500 or \$5 per MW of Unforced Capacity that the Installed Capacity Supplier is qualified to supply and/or place the Installed Capacity Supplier in the ICAP Spot Market Auction in order to purchase an amount of Unforced Capacity equal to the amount that Supplier is qualified to sell.~~

### ~~6.1.2 Failure to Bid, Schedule and Notify the NYISO of Outages~~

~~Section 4.8 of this ICAP Manual contains the daily bidding, scheduling, and notification requirements applicable to Installed Capacity Suppliers.~~

~~On any day in which the Installed Capacity Supplier, or its designated scheduling entity, fails to comply with these requirements, the NYISO may impose a financial sanction up to the product of a daily deficiency charge and the maximum number of MWs for which the NYISO should have received a bid, schedule, or other notification of operating status.~~

~~The deficiency charge may be up to one and one-half times the applicable Market Clearing Price of Unforced Capacity determined in the ICAP Spot Market Auction for each month in which the Installed Capacity Supplier is determined not to have complied with the foregoing requirements [see also Section 5.12.12.2 of the NYISO Services Tariff (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL: [http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)).~~

~~The NYISO will assess the sanction against the entity that the Installed Capacity Supplier has designated to provide the bids, schedules, and status notification.~~

## 6.2 Transmission Owner Sanctions

The *NYISO Load Forecasting Manual* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL: <http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/manuals/planning.jsp?maxDisplay=20>), and

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## 4. INSTALLED CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO INSTALLED CAPACITY SUPPLIERS

### 4.1 Overview

Resources must follow certain procedures and provide pertinent information to the NYISO on or before a specified date and time in order to qualify as Installed Capacity Suppliers. The requirements necessary to qualify as an Installed Capacity Supplier can be found in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below, and include Dependable Maximum Net Capability (DMNC) testing and maintenance schedule reporting.

After completing the procedures listed above, Resources that have qualified as Installed Capacity Suppliers must fulfill certain additional requirements provided by the NYISO in order to retain all of the privileges to which an Installed Capacity Supplier is entitled. These requirements are provided in detail in Sections 4.4 through 4.8 below. The requirements include reporting Operating Data; planned or scheduled maintenance and forced outage notification requirements; the Installed Capacity certification requirements; and bidding, scheduling, and notification responsibilities.

Certain Installed Capacity Suppliers must fulfill alternative or additional requirements provided by the NYISO in addition to or in place of the requirements found in Sections 4.2 through 4.8. These alternative or additional requirements can be found in Sections 4.9 through 4.13. Each of these sections addresses a different individual Resource.

Installed Capacity Suppliers that fail to fulfill the requirements detailed in Sections 4.2 through 4.13 are subject to sanctions, as provided in Section 5.12.12 of the *NYISO Services Tariff* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL: [http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)). ~~Details regarding these sanctions may be found in Section 6.1 of this ICAP Manual.~~


Section [4.14](#) details the procedures for requesting, granting and applying UDRs.

Resources may be physically located in the NYCA, or in an External Control Area that meets the recall and Curtailment requirements and the locational limitations specified in Section [2.7](#) of this *ICAP Manual*.

### 4.2 DMNC Procedures (Section 5.12.8 NYISO Services Tariff)

As specified in Section [4.2.2](#) below, in order to establish a DMNC rating, Installed Capacity Suppliers must submit results from a DMNC test or data from actual operation (“DMNC Demonstration”) from within the DMNC Test Periods (“in-period”) specified in Section [4.2.1](#) below, to the NYISO no later than the time specified in the ICAP Event Calendar on the sixtieth (60) calendar day following the end of each DMNC Test Period. Refer to

Section 4.12 of this *ICAP Manual* for additional information about requirements for Special Case Resources (SCRs). The submittal must provide the NYISO with the required documentation of the DMNC test data or data from actual operation and be in accordance with the procedures described below (unless exempt in accordance with the provisions of Section 4.4.3 of this *ICAP Manual*). In addition, Section 5.12.8 of the *NYISO Services Tariff* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL:

[http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)) provides for submitting DMNC test data or data from actual operation from outside the DMNC Test Period ("out-of-period") and prior to the next Capability Period. Failure to submit DMNC test data or data from actual operation may result in financial sanctions pursuant section 5.12.12 of the *NYISO Services Tariff* (available from the NYISO Web site at the following URL: [http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market\\_services.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/tariffs/market_services.jsp)) ~~and section 6.1 of this *ICAP Manual*.~~ 

DMNC test data or data from actual operation that has been validated as described below constitutes a DMNC rating for the purpose of establishing a generating Resource's Installed Capacity value. A subsequent adjustment is made pursuant to Section 4.5 and Attachment J of this *ICAP Manual* to determine each Resource's Unforced Capacity value.

DMNC test data or data from actual operation must be submitted in an acceptable format or it will be rejected. A 30-day verification period starts with a determination that the data has been deemed complete. Until the DMNC review function of the ICAP Market System goes live, the NYISO will use its best efforts to notify an Installed Capacity Supplier that its submission has been deemed incomplete within ten (10) business days of that submission. Upon determination that the information that has been submitted is complete, the NYISO will validate and approve the DMNC rating or reject it within 30 days of submittal if such submittal has been deemed complete at least 45 days prior to the data submittal deadline as noted below. Submittals deemed complete less than 45 days before the DMNC submittal deadline will be processed within 45 days of such submittal.

If the NYISO approves the Installed Capacity Supplier's submittal, the submitted DMNC value will be valid for the subsequent like Capability Period, and at the request of the Installed Capacity Supplier, may also serve as the valid DMNC rating for the balance of the current Capability Period beginning in the month following approval.

If the NYISO rejects the submitted DMNC value, the Installed Capacity Supplier may:

- a. resubmit DMNC test results or data from actual operation from within the current DMNC Test Period, or
- b. accept the NYISO determined DMNC value and resubmit it, or
- c. request an audit.

If the Installed Capacity Supplier requests an audit, the NYISO will work with the Installed Capacity Supplier to schedule the audit. If the audit results reveal that the Installed Capacity Supplier DMNC rating is correct, the DMNC test data or data from actual operation submitted by the Installed Capacity Supplier will remain in place. If the audit reveals that the NYISO rating is correct, the NYISO will instruct the Installed Capacity Supplier to resubmit the DMNC test data or data from actual operation with the DMNC rating

NYISO (a) will attribute zero performance to those Resources for purposes of satisfying the Resource’s capacity obligation, determining energy payments, and calculating shortfalls and deficiency charges, and (b) may impose sanctions pursuant to the NYISO Services Tariff Subsection 6.1.1 of this ICAP Manual.

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**4.4.7.2 Special Case Resources that are Generators**

RIPs shall report to the NYISO on or before 5:00:00 P.M. on the seventy-fifth (75th) day after the date of each called event or test, performance data of Special Case Resources that are Generators and were requested to operate in any month, using an import file formatted as specified in the *NYISO Demand Response Information System User's Guide* (available from the NYISO Web site at [http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets\\_operations/documents/manuals\\_guides/index.jsp](http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/documents/manuals_guides/index.jsp)).

For example, the NYISO must receive from the RIP performance data for Special Case Resources that are Generators on or before 5:00:00 P.M. on June 29 their data pertaining to the month of April if they were called upon to operate on April 15.

If the performance data for any Special Case Resources are not imported by the RIP into the DRIS by 5:00:00 P.M. on the seventy-fifth (75th) day after the date of each event or test, the NYISO (a) will attribute zero performance to those Resources for purposes of satisfying the Resource’s capacity obligation, determining energy payments, and calculating shortfalls and deficiency charges, and (b) may impose sanctions pursuant to the NYISO Services Tariff Subsection 6.1.1 of this ICAP Manual.

**4.4.7.3 Reporting of Special Case Resource Operating Data**

The NYISO will treat the Special Case Resource-specific operating data that is received by the NYISO as confidential Transmission System Information and shall provide copies of such resource-specific (disaggregated) operating data to the transmission function of the Transmission Owner in whose transmission district the Special Case Resource is located in accordance with Section 4.0 of the NYISO’s Code of Conduct (Attachment F to the *NYISO OATT*).

**4.4.8 Municipally Owned Generation**

Municipally owned generation shall report to the NYISO GADS Data or data equivalent to GADS Data pertaining to the previous month so that it is received by the NYISO no later than the 20th day of each month. For example, municipally owned generation shall report to the NYISO, which must be received by the NYISO on or before May 20, data equivalent to GADS Data pertaining to their operations during the month of April.

**4.4.9 Resources Capable of Supplying Unforced Capacity in New York**

This subsection applies to Resources that (1) have not previously been in operation in the NYCA, (2) are not subject to the requirements of Subsection 4.4.14.4 through Subsection

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