### Summary of Proposals for the Comprehensive Mitigation Filing

Presented to:

**Business Issues Committee** 

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
January 23, 2002

### Purposes and Objectives

- The comprehensive filing will include the changes to the current mitigation structure needed to implement a comprehensive mitigation plan in compliance with FERC's November 27<sup>th</sup> orders.
  - Changes are proposed to:
    - ► Address market power concerns in New York City;
    - Improve the operation of the automated mitigation procedure (AMP) in the day-ahead market;
    - ► Establish thresholds for screening non-price bid parameters;
    - Clarify reference price development for units that seldom run in-merit, and for new generators;
- The filing will describe an internally consistent mitigation structure for the long-term, as well as the short-term changes to be made prior to summer 2002.
- The filing will reflect coordination with other Northeast ISOs.


- The ISO will soon be modeling the 138 KV interface within NYC as well as 7 other sub-load pockets on the 138 KV system in real time (SCD).
- Once completed, these modeling changes will allow prices within the load pockets to reflect the constraint and reduce the need for out-of-merit dispatch.
- These constraints raise potential market power issues:
  - When the load pocket constraints are not binding, suppliers in the load pockets face competition from supply in other areas.
  - When the constraints are binding, units within the load pockets frequently must run to resolve the constraint.
  - ► Concentration of generation ownership within the pockets is generally high.
  - Suppliers within the pockets may be able to increase the frequency of the load pocket congestion by withholding supply.
- The following charts show the frequency with which the constraints in NYC and the load pockets have been binding.

#### Cost of Congestion Measured by Shadow Price January to December 2001



The shadow price represents the economic value of the constraint

#### Frequency of Out-Of-Merit Calls in NYC Load Pockets June to December 2001



- The real-time mitigation proposal for NYC is consistent with the conduct-impact structure of the general mitigation measures.
- The primary difference between the NYC mitigation and the general mitigation is the use of lower thresholds for evaluating conduct and impact i.e., load pocket thresholds ("LPT").
- The proposed structure would be applied when constraints are binding the general mitigation measures would apply to generation within NYC when constraints are not binding.

#### Conduct test

- Bids of units within the load pocket are compared to reference levels. (same reference prices used for general mitigation).
- Bids exceeding the reference levels by more than the applicable LPT fail the conduct test.

#### Impact Test

- The ideal impact test involves two passes of the dispatch model (with and without mitigation). Since this isn't possible within SCD, the following proxy is proposed:
- Resources exceeding the conduct test would be mitigated if:
  - They are scheduled in the prior SCD interval (They have increased the price of the marginal resource).
  - They are not scheduled, but their reference levels are below the marginal resource by more than the LPT (They have withheld an economic resource and caused a more expensive resource to set prices).


#### <u>Duration</u>

• Mitigation will continue at least for the balance of the hour.

- The real-time mitigation proposal for NYC is consistent with the conductimpact structure of the general mitigation measures – applied when constraints are binding.
- However, the locational market power associated with the transmission constraints in the city justify load-pocket thresholds (LPT) that decline as the frequency of the constraints increases.
  - ➤ The declining LPT addresses potential for sustained exercises of "low-level" market power by raising prices by the threshold amount.
  - The frequency of congestion would be measured by the number of hours of congestion over a rolling 12 month period.
  - ► LPT would naturally change with changes in congestion due to new generation or transmission.
- The LPT would be adjusted for changes in fuel prices. The LPT function is shown on the following chart.

**In-City Conduct and Impact Thresholds** 

**Alternative Scenarios** 



#### The threshold function is defined by the following:

Threshold \* Constrained Hours= Max % ValueORThreshold = Max % \* Avg. Price \* 87608760 Hours \* Average Priceof ThresholdConstrained Hours

### New York City Mitigation: Day-Ahead

- The real-time mitigation proposal will be applied to the day-ahead in the longer run (post-summer), with the additional feature that:
  - The AMP software will conduct an actual impact test, rather than using the proxies proposed for the real-time.
- In the short-run, analysis of the current ConEd In-City mitigation measures support the following changes:
  - ► Use of the NYISO reference prices;
  - ➤ Shift in the threshold to 7.5% to account for the fact that losses are included in the price ratio;

### New York City Mitigation: Day-Ahead

- The analysis of price differences (using final prices) in 2000 and 2001 between Indian Point 2 and Ravenswood 3 revealed:
  - In 7% to 12% of the hours when the price difference was greater than 5%, the difference would have been less than 5% if difference in losses were removed;
    - Increasing threshold to 7.5% would have virtually eliminated these cases.
  - ► The difference in losses generally ranged from 0 to 3%, averaging 1.6%.
  - ➤ Given the average price and losses, the current 5% threshold would cause mitigation to trigger when congestion equals \$1.50 while the 7.5% threshold would raise this trigger to \$2.50.
    - \$2.50 is a level proposed by the PSC to eliminate noise in this type of congestion measure.
- Only 3 days showed price differences greater than 5% in the off-peak night hours without any other hours exceeding 5%.

#### Automated Mitigation Procedure: Day-Ahead

- The AMP remains simply an automated process for implementing mitigation does not limit or expand NYISO's mitigation authority.
- The mitigation filing will describe all proposed changes to the AMP that are proposed in the short-run and longer-run:
  - 50 MW portfolio exclusion with provision to remove or eliminate exclusion is impact is evident;
  - Additional SCUC pass to limit mitigation to those hours and zones demonstrating adequate impact;
  - Inclusion of start-up and minimum generation bids with min-gen exemption for late-day starts;
  - ► More detailed representation of reference prices within the MIS system.
- The NYISO and stakeholders are currently finalizing the priorities for these revisions and other projects for implementation in Summer 2002.

## Other Modifications to Mitigation Plan

#### **Reference Prices**

- Formula to be used as starting point for negotiated reference price: heat rate \* fuel costs + emissions level \* allowance price + var O&M
  - ► Formula based on information in the Reference Price cost spreadsheet.
  - ► Starting Point may be adjusted to reflect other marginal costs.
- Accepted bids during congested hours not included in reference prices for incity units.

#### **Bid Parameters**

- Establish independent thresholds for non-price bid parameters
- Hour-based threshold for time-based bid parameters (e.g., min run time, min down time, start time, etc.)
- Percent thresholds for other bid parameters.

## Other Modifications to Mitigation Plan

#### **Other Threshold Changes**

- Exclude bids below \$25 for energy and \$5 for reserves from screening.
- Reduce the quantity thresholds to zero for physical withholding in-City (impact test still applies).

# Application of Mitigation to New Generation (including net new capacity by existing owners)

- Proposal is designed to account for the competitive benefits provided by new generation in the short-run and minimize potential disincentive to enter.
- Set Reference Level Floor for a period of 3 years equal to the average of the peak LBMPs at its location for the twelve months preceding its entry.

#### **Data Requirements**

• Modify the Addendum to the MMP specifying the data the NYISO is entitled to receive upon request to include any contract or agreement conferring a right to specify bids or otherwise control the output of a unit owned by another entity.

### Regional Consistency on Mitigation

- Both PJM and New England employ a unit-specific bid cap as a primary mitigation tool, although the triggers are different:
  - ► PJM employs its bid cap at variable cost + 10% when transmission constraints are binding (other than the major interfaces) no conduct or impact tests.
  - New England's mitigation measure for non-congested areas is very similar to New York's structure – conduct and impact thresholds match New York's.
  - ► New England's mitigation measure for congested areas will be revised to coincide with the implementation of the Standard Market Design ("SMD").
  - New England is considering New York's proposed structure for mitigation in constrained areas.
  - ➤ Some of the proposed changes for NY are intended to implement elements of the New England measures (e.g., \$25 exclusion, bid characteristic thresholds)
- Although different triggers are used, the similarity in the underlying measures should eliminate any barriers (software or otherwise) to standardizing later.
- Prospective mitigation by means of a unit-specific bid cap should not be a barrier to efficient trading throughout the Northeast market.