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February 8, 2005

FILE NO.: 55430.000044

**BY HAND**

The Honorable Magalie R. Salas, Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
888 First Street, N.E., Room 1A  
Washington, D.C. 20426

Re: New York Independent System Operator, Inc.'s  
Submission of Services Tariff Attachment C  
in Docket No. ER04-230-007

Dear Ms. Salas:

On January 28, 2005, the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. ("NYISO") submitted a compliance filing in the above-captioned proceeding.

Due to an administrative error, the NYISO inadvertently submitted two copies of revised tariff sheets in Attachment C of its Open Access Transmission Tariff ("OATT"). The NYISO had intended to submit one copy of OATT Attachment C and one copy of revised sheets in Attachment C of the Market Administration and Control Area Services Tariff ("Services Tariff"). Therefore, the NYISO respectfully requests that it be permitted to submit Services Tariff Attachment C to substitute for the extra copy of OATT Attachment C in the Services Tariff (Volume 2). Both clean and blackline versions of Services Tariff Attachment C are provided.

The NYISO is electronically serving a copy of this letter and its attachments on all participants that were electronically served a copy of the January 28, 2005 filing.

Respectfully submitted,

Ted J. Murphy  
Counsel for  
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

cc: Service List

## CLEAN TARIFF SHEETS

**ATTACHMENT C**

**FORMULAS FOR DETERMINING BID PRODUCTION  
 COST GUARANTEE PAYMENTS**

**I. Supplemental Payments to Generators**

Three supplemental payments for Generators are described in this attachment: (i) Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost guarantees; (ii) Real-time Bid Production guarantees for all intervals except maximum generation pickups and large event reserve pickups; and (iii) Real-time Bid Production Cost guarantees for maximum generation pickups and large event reserve pickups. Generators shall be eligible for these payments under the circumstances described in Article 4 and Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff.

For purposes of this Section I only, Demand Side Resources that are eligible to provide non-synchronized Operating Reserves under Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff, shall be treated the same as Generators with respect to the determination of supplemental payments insofar as they are providing non-synchronized Operating Reserves. Demand Side Resources that provide Demand Reductions through the Day-Ahead Market shall be eligible for supplemental payments under Section II, but not this Section I.

**A. Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee Formulas**

Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[ \sum_{h=1}^{24} \left( \begin{array}{l} \int C_{gh}^{DA} + MGC_{gh}^{DA} MGH_{gh}^{DA} + SUC_{gh}^{DA} NSUH_{gh}^{DA} \\ - LBMP_{gh}^{DA} EH_{gh}^{DA} - NASR_{gh}^{DA} \end{array} \right), 0 \right]$$

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Filed to comply with order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. ER04-230-000, et. al., issued February 11, 2004, 106 FERC ¶ 61,111 (2004).

Where:

- $G$  = set of Generators;
- $EH_{gh}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by Generator  $g$  in hour  $h$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGH_{gh}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by the minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in hour  $h$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $C_{gh}^{DA}$  = Bid cost submitted by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Bid cost curve for Generator  $g$ , in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $MGC_{gh}^{DA}$  = Minimum Generation Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Minimum Generation Bid for Generator  $g$ , for hour  $h$  in the Day-Ahead Market, expressed in terms of \$/MW;
- $SUC_{gh}^{DA}$  = Start-Up Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Start-Up Bid for Generator  $g$ , in hour  $h$  into the Day-Ahead Market expressed in terms of \$/start;
- $NSUH_{gh}^{DA}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  is scheduled Day-Ahead to start up in hour  $h$ ;
- $LBMP_{gh}^{DA}$  = Day-Ahead LBMP at Generator  $g$ 's bus in hour  $h$  expressed in \$/MWh;

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$NASR_{gh}^{DA}$  = Net Ancillary Services revenue, expressed in terms of \$, paid to Generator  $g$  as a result of having been committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day- Ahead to operate in hour  $h$  is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support Service payments received by that Generator for that hour, if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity and has been scheduled to operate in that hour; (2) Regulation Service payments made to that Generator for all Regulation Service it is scheduled Day-Ahead to provide in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide that amount of Regulation Service in that hour (unless the Bid exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service that was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day-Ahead, in which case this component shall be zero); and (3) payments made to that Generator for providing Spinning Reserve and synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour if it is committed Day-Ahead to provide such reserves in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide Spinning Reserve and synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour.

B. Real-Time Bid Production Guarantee Formulas for All Intervals With No Maximum Generation Pickups or Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \left( \frac{EI_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA})}{EI_{gi}^{DA}} + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) * \frac{S_i}{3600} \right) - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} + RRAC_{gi} \right], 0$$

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where:

- $s_i$  = number of seconds in RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $C_{gi}^{RT}$  = Bid cost submitted by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Bid cost for Generator  $g$ , in the RTD for the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $MGI_{gi}^{RT}$  = metered Energy produced by minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGI_{gi}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGC_{gi}^{RT}$  = Minimum Generation Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Minimum Generation Bid for Generator  $g$ , in the Real-Time Market for the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ , expressed in terms of \$/MW;
- $SUC_{gi}^{RT}$  = Start-Up Bid by Generator  $g$  (which shall be deemed to be zero in the case of Self-Committed Fixed and Self-Committed Flexible Generators), or when applicable the mitigated Start-Up Bid for Generator  $g$ , for the hour that includes interval  $i$  into RTD expressed in terms of \$/start;
- $NSUI_{gi}^{RT}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  started up in the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $NSUI_{gi}^{DA}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  is scheduled Day-Ahead to start up in the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $LBMP_{gi}^{RT}$  = Real-Time LBMP at Generator  $g$ 's bus in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $N$  = number of eligible RTD intervals in 24-hour day excluding any maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups (which are addressed separately in subsection I.3 below) and excluding any RTD intervals where  $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  is less than  $EI_{gi}^{DA}$ ;

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- $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  = if  $EOP_{ig} > AEI_{ig}$  then  $\min(\max(AEI_{ig}, RTSen_{ig}), EOP_{ig})$  and  $\max(\min(AEI_{ig}, RTSen_{ig}), EOP_{ig})$  otherwise
- $EI_{gi}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to be produced by Generator g in the hour that includes RTD interval i expressed in terms of MW.
- $RTSen_{ig}$  = Real-time Energy scheduled for Generator g in interval i, and calculated as the arithmetic average of the 6-second AGC Base Point Signals sent to Generator g during the course of interval i expressed in terms of MW;
- $AEI_{ig}$  = average Actual Energy Injection by Generator g in interval i but not more than  $RTSen_{ig}$  plus any Compensable Overgeneration expressed in terms of MW;
- $EOP_{ig}$  = the Economic Operating Point of Generator g in interval i expressed in terms of MW;

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$NASR_{gi}^{TOT}$  = Net Ancillary Services scheduled revenue paid to Generator  $g$  as a result of either having been committed Day-Ahead to operate in hour that includes RTD interval  $i$  or having operated in interval  $i$  is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support Service payments received by that Generator for that RTD interval, if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity; (2) Regulation Service payments that would be made to that Generator for that hour based on a Performance Index of 1, less the Bid(s) placed by that Generator to provide Regulation Service in that hour at the time it was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services to do so (unless the Bid(s) exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service, in which case this component shall be zero); (3) payments made to that Generator for providing Spinning Reserve or synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour, less the Bid placed by that Generator to provide such reserves in that hour at the time it was scheduled to do so; and (4) Lost Opportunity Cost payments made to that Generator in that hour as a result of reducing that Generator's output in order for it to provide Voltage Support Service.

$NASR_{gi}^{DA}$  = The proportion of the Day-Ahead net Ancillary Services revenue that is applicable to interval  $i$  calculated by multiplying the  $NASR_{gh}^{DA}$  for the hour that includes interval  $i$  by  $s_i/3600$ .

$RRAP_{gi}$  = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Payment for Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$.

$RRAC_{gi}$  = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Charge for Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$.

Time periods including reserve pickups, and time periods following a reserve pickup in which the dispatch of a given Generator is constrained by its downward ramp rate, will not be included in the above calculation of supplemental payments for that Generator.

Supplemental payments to Generators that trip before completing their minimum run-time (for Generators that were not scheduled to run Day-Ahead) or before running for the number of hours they were scheduled to operate (for Generators scheduled to run Day-Ahead) may be reduced by the ISO, per ISO Procedures.

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In the event that the ISO re-institutes penalties for poor Regulation Service performance under Section 8.0 of Rate Schedule 3 such penalties will not be taken into account when calculating supplemental payments under this Attachment C.

C. Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantees for Intervals With Maximum Generation Pickups or Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantee Payment =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^M \max \left( \begin{aligned} & \left( \frac{EI_{gi}^{RT}}{EI_{gi}^{DA}} \left( \int C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) \right) * \frac{S_i}{3600} \right. \\ & \left. + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) \\ & - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} + RRAC_{gi} \end{aligned} \right), 0 \right]$$

where:

M = number of maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups in the 24 hour day but excluding any maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups where  $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  is less than  $EI_{gi}^{DA}$ ;

The definition of all other variables is identical to those defined in Section I.B above.

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## **II. Supplemental Payments for Curtailment Initiation Costs**

A supplemental payment for Curtailment Initiation Costs shall be made when the Curtailment Initiation Cost Bid and the Demand Reduction Bid price for any Demand Reduction committed by the ISO in the Day-Ahead market over the twenty-four (24) hour day exceeds Day-Ahead LBMP revenue, provided however that Supplemental payments made to Demand Reduction Providers that fail to complete their scheduled reductions may be reduced by the ISO, pursuant to ISO Procedures.

## **III. Supplemental Payments for Special Case Resources**

A supplemental payment for Minimum Payment Nominations shall be made when the Minimum Payment Nomination for any Special Case Resource committed by the ISO during a Forecast Operating Reserve shortage exceeds the LBMP revenue received for performance by that Special Case Resource.

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**BLACKLINE TARIFF SHEETS**

**ATTACHMENT C**

**FORMULAS FOR DETERMINING BID PRODUCTION  
 COST GUARANTEE PAYMENTS**

**I. Supplemental Payments to Generators**

Three supplemental payments for Generators are described in this attachment: (i) Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost guarantees; (ii) Real-time Bid Production guarantees for all intervals except maximum generation pickups and large event reserve pickups; and (iii) Real-time Bid Production Cost guarantees for maximum generation pickups and large event reserve pickups. Generators shall be eligible for these payments under the circumstances described in Article 4 and Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff.

For purposes of this Section I only, Demand Side Resources that are eligible to provide non-synchronized Operating Reserves under Rate Schedule 4 of this ISO Services Tariff, shall be treated the same as Generators with respect to the determination of supplemental payments insofar as they are providing non-synchronized Operating Reserves. Demand Side Resources that provide Demand Reductions through the Day-Ahead Market shall be eligible for supplemental payments under Section II, but not this Section I.

**A. Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee Formulas**

Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[ \sum_{h=1}^{24} \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{EH}_{gh}^{DA} \\ \text{J} \text{C}_{gh}^{DA} + \text{MGC}_{gh}^{DA} \text{MGH}_{gh}^{DA} + \text{SUC}_{gh}^{DA} \text{NSUH}_{gh}^{DA} \\ \text{MGH}_{gh}^{DA} \\ - \text{LBMP}_{gh}^{DA} \text{EH}_{gh}^{DA} - \text{NASR}_{gh}^{DA} \end{array} \right), 0 \right]$$

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Where:

- $G$  = set of Generators;
- $EH_{gh}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by Generator  $g$  in hour  $h$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGH_{gh}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by the minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in hour  $h$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $C_{gh}^{DA}$  = Bid cost submitted by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Bid cost curve for Generator  $g$ , in the Day-Ahead Market for hour  $h$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $MGC_{gh}^{DA}$  = Minimum Generation Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Minimum Generation Bid for Generator  $g$ , for hour  $h$  in the Day-Ahead Market, expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $SUC_{gh}^{DA}$  = Start-Up Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Start-Up Bid for Generator  $g$ , in hour  $h$  into the Day-Ahead Market expressed in terms of \$/start;
- $NSUH_{gh}^{DA}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  is scheduled Day-Ahead to start up in hour  $h$ ;
- $LBMP_{gh}^{DA}$  = Day-Ahead LBMP at Generator  $g$ 's bus in hour  $h$  expressed in \$/MWh;

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$NASR_{gh}^{DA}$  = Net Ancillary Services revenue, expressed in terms of \$, paid to Generator  $g$  as a result of having been committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day-Ahead to operate in hour  $h$  is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support Service payments received by that Generator for that hour, if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity and has been scheduled to operate in that hour; (2) Regulation Service payments made to that Generator for all Regulation Service it is scheduled Day-Ahead to provide in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide that amount of Regulation Service in that hour (unless the Bid exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service that was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day-Ahead, in which case this component shall be zero); and (3) payments made to that Generator for providing Spinning Reserve and synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour if it is committed Day-Ahead to provide such reserves in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide Spinning Reserve and synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour.

B. Real-Time Bid Production Guarantee Formulas for All Intervals With No Maximum Generation Pickups or Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \left( \frac{EI_{gi}^{RT}}{EI_{gi}^{DA}} \int C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) * \frac{S_i}{3600} - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} + RRAC_{gi} \right], 0$$

where:

- $s_i$  = number of seconds in RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $C_{gi}^{RT}$  = Bid cost submitted by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Bid cost for Generator  $g$ , in the RTD for the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $MGI_{gi}^{RT}$  = metered Energy produced by minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGI_{gi}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by minimum generation segment of Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of MW;
- $MGC_{gi}^{RT}$  = Minimum Generation Bid by Generator  $g$ , or when applicable the mitigated Minimum Generation Bid for Generator  $g$ , in the Real-Time Market for the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ , expressed in terms of \$/MW;
- $SUC_{gi}^{RT}$  = Start-Up Bid by Generator  $g$  (which shall be deemed to be zero in the case of Self-Committed Fixed and Self-Committed Flexible Generators), or when applicable the mitigated Start-Up Bid for Generator  $g$ , for the hour that includes interval  $i$  into RTD expressed in terms of \$/start;
- $NSUI_{gi}^{RT}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  started up in the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $NSUI_{gi}^{DA}$  = number of times Generator  $g$  is scheduled Day-Ahead to start up in the hour that includes RTD interval  $i$ ;
- $LBMP_{gi}^{RT}$  = Real-Time LBMP at Generator  $g$ 's bus in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- $N$  = number of eligible RTD intervals in 24-hour day excluding any maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups (which are addressed separately in subsection I.3 below) and excluding any RTD intervals where  $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  is less than  $EI_{gi}^{DA}$ ;

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- $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  = if  $EOP_{ig} > AEI_{ig}$  then  $\min(\max(AEI_{ig}, RTSen_{ig}), EOP_{ig})$  and  $\max(\min(AEI_{ig}, RTSen_{ig}), EOP_{ig})$  otherwise
- $EI_{gi}^{DA}$  = Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to be produced by Generator g in the hour that includes RTD interval i expressed in terms of MW.
- $RTSen_{ig}$  = Real-time Energy scheduled for Generator g in interval i, and calculated as the arithmetic average of the 6-second AGC Base Point Signals sent to Generator g during the course of interval i expressed in terms of MW;
- $AEI_{ig}$  = average Actual Energy Injection by Generator g in interval i but not more than  $RTSen_{ig}$  plus any Compensable Overgeneration expressed in terms of MW;
- $EOP_{ig}$  = the Economic Operating Point of Generator g in interval i expressed in terms of MW;

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$NASR_{gi}^{TOT}$  = Net Ancillary Services scheduled revenue paid to Generator  $g$  as a result of either having been committed Day-Ahead to operate in hour that includes RTD interval  $i$  or having operated in interval  $i$  is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support Service payments received by that Generator for that RTD interval, if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity; (2) Regulation Service payments that would be made to that Generator for that hour based on a Performance Index of 1, less the Bid(s) placed by that Generator to provide Regulation Service in that hour at the time it was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services to do so (unless the Bid(s) exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service, in which case this component shall be zero); (3) payments made to that Generator for providing Spinning Reserve or synchronized 30-Minute Reserve in that hour, less the Bid placed by that Generator to provide such reserves in that hour at the time it was scheduled to do so; and (4) Lost Opportunity Cost payments made to that Generator in that hour as a result of reducing that Generator's output in order for it to provide Voltage Support Service.

$NASR_{gi}^{DA}$  = The proportion of the Day-Ahead net Ancillary Services revenue that is applicable to interval  $i$  calculated by multiplying the  $NASR_{gh}^{DA}$  for the hour that includes interval  $i$  by  $s_i/3600$ .

$RRAP_{gi}$  = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Payment for Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$.

$RRAC_{gi}$  = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Charge for Generator  $g$  in RTD interval  $i$  expressed in terms of \$.

Time periods including reserve pickups, and time periods following a reserve pickup in which the dispatch of a given Generator is constrained by its downward ramp rate, will not be included in the above calculation of supplemental payments for that Generator.

Supplemental payments to Generators that trip before completing their minimum run-time (for Generators that were not scheduled to run Day-Ahead) or before running for the number of hours they were scheduled to operate (for Generators scheduled to run Day-Ahead) may be reduced by the ISO, per ISO Procedures.

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In the event that the ISO re-institutes penalties for poor Regulation Service performance under Section 8.0 of Rate Schedule 3 such penalties will not be taken into account when calculating supplemental payments under this Attachment C.

C. Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantees for Intervals With Maximum Generation Pickups or Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantee Payment =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^M \max \left( \left( \frac{EI_{gi}^{RT}}{EI_{gi}^{DA}} \left( C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) * \frac{S_i}{3600} \right), 0 \right) - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} + RRAC_{gi} \right]$$

where:

M = number of maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups in the 24 hour day but excluding any maximum generation pickups or large event reserve pickups where  $EI_{gi}^{RT}$  is less than  $EI_{gi}^{DA}$ ;

The definition of all other variables is identical to those defined in Section I.B above.

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## II. Supplemental Payments for Curtailment Initiation Costs

A supplemental payment for Curtailment Initiation Costs shall be made when the Curtailment Initiation Cost Bid and the Demand Reduction Bid price for any Demand Reduction committed by the ISO in the Day-Ahead market over the twenty-four (24) hour day exceeds Day-Ahead LBMP revenue, provided however that Supplemental payments made to Demand Reduction Providers that fail to complete their scheduled reductions may be reduced by the ISO, pursuant to ISO Procedures.

## III. Supplemental Payments for Special Case Resources

A supplemental payment for Minimum Payment Nominations shall be made when the Minimum Payment Nomination for any Special Case Resource committed by the ISO during a Forecast Operating Reserve shortage exceeds the LBMP revenue received for performance by that Special Case Resource.