

Design options for shaping DGO price cap




Summary of Proposals

Proposal	Design Factors for price cap
ISO	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Meet annual \$105 DGO price cap2. Adjust for actual summer DC prices3. Adjust for Individual DGO summer/winter capabilities4. Adjust for DC price changes
PSC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Meet annual \$105 DGO price cap2. Adjust for actual summer DC prices3. Adjust for Individual DGO summer/winter capabilities
Original	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Meet annual \$105 DGO price cap2. Adjust for actual summer DC prices3. Adjust for Aggregate DGO summer/winter capabilities
Alternative	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Meet annual \$105 DGO price cap2. Adjust for actual summer DC prices3. Adjust for Aggregate DGO summer/winter capabilities4. ISO to rebate over collections among DGO suppliers

Benefits/Concerns of Proposals

Proposal	Design Factors	Benefits	Concerns
ISO	3. Adjust for Individual DGO summer/winter capabilities	- Highest assurance of collection of price cap	- Cause a \$10 M over collection/rebate to LSEs
	4. Adjust for DC price changes	- Faster collection	- Complex - Imbalance between Summer/winter periods
PSC	3. Adjust for Individual DGO summer/winter capabilities	- Eliminates complexity of adjusting for DC price changes, w/o risks to \$105	
Original	3. Adjust for Aggregate DGO summer/winter capabilities	- Simple - Eliminate \$10M LSE rebate	- Individual DGO may over/under collect cap by \$4 M
Alternative	3. Adjust for Aggregate DGO summer/winter capabilities	- Simple - Eliminate LSE rebate	
	4. ISO to rebate over collections among DGO suppliers	- Assurance of price cap collection	

Summary of Proposals

Proposal	LSE Harmful	DGO Supplier Harmful
ISO		
PSC		
Original		
Alternative A		