

NYISO Board of Directors / Management Committee Meeting

October 17, 2000

Summer 2001 Outlook and Plans

Bill Museler President & CEO

New York Independent System Operator

Introduction

✓ Overview of Summer 2001 Preparations ✓ "Three-legged stool"

- Complete Market Enhancements
- Implement Price Sensitive Load Capability
- Establish "Circuit Breaker"



Key Questions?

 Are the NYISO's Markets always Workably Competitive?

✓ Response:

- NYISO Markets are generally competitive
- There are instances when market conditions provide an opportunity to exercise market power
- The lack of price sensitive load exacerbates this potential situation.

Key Questions?


- ✓ When Markets are not Workably Competitive, how should prices be set?
- ✓ Response:
 - Clearing prices could be set by one of several mechanisms in the absence of competitive market conditions



Future Direction

- Modify the NYISO's market design (Tariff) to permanently incorporate provisions addressing such situations.
- ✓ Bid caps should no longer be necessary for Summer 2001, assuming such provisions are adopted and approved by FERC





Price Sensitive Load Development

John Buechler

October 17, 2000

New York Independent System Operator

Price-Responsive Load Project

- ✓ Goals:
 - identify existing PRL programs in US and abroad
 - with MPs, develop programs that fit specific needs of NY marketplace
 - conduct focus groups, develop user surveys to estimate benefits
 - finalize recommendations December 2000
 - implementation target June 2001
 - may identify programs that can be implemented in Winter 2000-2001

Contracted by NYISO to Neenan & Associates in August 2000


Activity to Date

- Price-Responsive Load Working Group formed in Sept.
 2000 to provide forum for MP input
- ✓ PRLWG solicited initial strawman input by Sept. 22 ongoing refinement, prioritizing of programs
- ✓ Wide range of programs investigated:
 - emergency load reduction
 - day ahead & real time load bidding
 - Ionger-term technology-based solutions

Project Schedule

- ✓ Focus group meetings with market sectors conducted on Sept. 27 and Oct. 4
- Regional focus group meetings with targeted end-users to be conducted in late October
- Program recommendations finalized by end of 2000 possible implementation of some programs during winter 2000-2001





Towards a Continuous Workably Competitive Electricity Market

Alternatives to Price Caps

NYISO Board/Management Committee Meeting October 17, 2000

Charles A. King, PE Vice President Market Services

New York Independent System Operator

Alternatives to Bid Caps

- ✓ Bid caps limit the offers all participants can make under all conditions.
- ✓ Alternatively, *bid mitigation* limits the offers only participants with market power can make.
- Existing NYISO mitigation plan is prospective not retroactive.
- Participants with market power can "steal the golden egg" for one day under existing mitigation.

Alternatives to Bid Caps

- During times when market conditions are no longer workably competitive, clearing prices do not reflect the reasonable interaction of supply and demand.
- ✓ A mechanism is needed that reasonably reflects prices that would occur under competitive conditions.
- ✓ One such mechanism is the "Circuit Breaker" approach.



Definition of a Circuit Breaker

 A "Circuit-Breaker" is a selective bid mitigation mechanism which is activated when conditions are not workably competitive.




Multiple Strawmen Approaches

- ✓ Strawman #1 : Excess Capacity Comparison
- ✓ Strawman #2 : Mitigated Price Comparison
- ✓ Strawman #3 : Variation Using Out-of-Merit Status

✓ Others ???



Circuit Breaker Strawman #1




CB Strawman #1 : Excess Capacity Comparison

- ✓ Difference between total system capacity and system demand forecast is classified as excess capacity
- Any supplier with capacity greater than excess is deemed to have market power and therefore subject to mitigation
- Suppliers subject to mitigation are automatically mitigated to *reference offers* during times of system

stress

Circuit Breaker Strawman #2

Difference Between Mitigated and Unmitigated Clearing Prices



CB Strawman #2 : Mitigated Price Comparison

- ✓ Based on differences between mitigated and unmitigated market clearing prices.
- ✓ Differences are greater during high load/low supply periods.
- Threshold based on historical patterns of noncompetitive high demand
- All generating unit bids *above mitigation reference price threshold* are mitigated.

CB Strawman #3 : Variation with Out-of-Merit Status

- ✓ Based on differences between mitigated and unmitigated market clearing prices.
- ✓ Differences are greater during high load/low supply periods.
- Threshold based on historical patterns of noncompetitive high demand
- All generating unit bids *above mitigation reference price threshold* are set out-of-merit.
- Mitigated units receive bid, but do not set price

Going Forward....

- Engage Stakeholder input to develop & refine existing and/or new strawman proposals.
- Obtain MC & NYISO Board endorsement of consensus CB proposal.
- ✓ Identify software/procedure specifications & Tariff/Mitigation Plan changes.
- ✓ Initiate implementation to ensure needed functionality by *Summer 2001*.

Conclusions

- ✓ Bid Caps apply to all participants at all times not only those with market power and not only during periods when the market is no longer workably competitive.
- Alternatively, a Circuit Breaker mechanism selectively impacts only those with market power and only during periods when the market is no longer workably competitive.



Conclusions continued

 Circuit Breaker prevents the one day gap in current mitigation procedure.

 ✓ NYISO should proceed to develop and deploy a CB mechanism in preparation for Summer 2001

