



# SUBSTANTIVE SETTLEMENTS ISSUES DISCUSSION

Agenda Item 5

June 23, 2003
ISO-NE Markets Committee
NYISO Market Structures Working Group





System Conditions Example

NY NE

Net Participant Interchange: 100 MW →

Participant Interchange refers to transactions arranged by Participants that are economic and checked out

- able to clear in the financial markets.

Net Participant Interchange is the Sum of:

- \* Day-Ahead Transactions confirmed for Real-Time Delivery and
- \* Cleared Incremental Real-Time Transactions





## <u>VRD Imbalance Issue</u>

System Conditions Example

<u>NY</u> <u>NE</u>

Net Participant Interchange: 100 MW →

ISO *Physical* Interchange 300 MW →

 ISO's will schedule the Physical Interchange based upon system economics, not on sum of Participant financial transactions.





#### <u>VRD Imbalance Issue</u>

System Conditions Example

<u>NY</u> <u>NE</u>

Net Part. Interchange 100 MW →

ISO Physical interchange 300 MW →

LMP/LBMP (post VRD) 40\$/MW 45\$/MW
 \$5 price differential remains after the ISOs
 schedule a 300mw transfer





System Conditions Example

	<u>NY</u>	<u>NE</u>
Net Part. Interchange	100 MW	<b>→</b>
ISO Physical interchange	300 MW	<b>→</b>
<ul><li>LMP/LBMP (Post VRD)</li></ul>	40\$/MW	45\$/MW

VRD MWs to be settled (300 - 100) = 200MW

- The amount of energy transactions settled financially must equal the physical schedule of 300 mw.
  - 100 MW are settled as Participant Transaction
  - 200 MW are settled as VRD transaction





System Conditions Example

NY NE

Net Participant Interchange 100 MW →

ISO Physical interchange 300 MW →

– LMP/LBMP (Post VRD)40\$/MW45\$/MW

VRD MW to be settled (300 - 100) = 200MW

VRD \$ to be settled (200 \* (45 - 40)) = \$1,000





System Conditions Example

VRD \$ to be settled

$$(200 * (45 - 40)) = $1,000$$

 Congestion on interface and/or conservative ISO scheduling should create a trend toward positive balance for distribution

However

Imbalance could at times be negative





Distribution of imbalance (\$1,000 in example) Alternatives:

- \*Real-Time auction revenue rights to VRD transactions
  - -Not attractive if prices converge
  - -Congestion would make rights valuable





Distribution of imbalance (\$1,000 in example)
Alternatives:

\* Real-Time auction revenue rights to VRD transactions

\*Split Savings

(There are numerous ways that the savings could be split between the markets)





Distribution of imbalance (\$1,000 in example)

#### **Alternatives:**

- \* Real-Time auction revenue rights to VRD transactions
- \* Split Savings
- \*Delivering Area

Receiving area experiences the benefit of lower prices as the result of VRD; distributing any price residual price separation benefits to the delivering area will have support





Distribution of imbalance (\$1,000 in example)

#### **Alternatives:**

- \*Auction rights to VRD transactions
- \*Split Savings
- \*Delivering Area
- \*Other
  - Detailed, collaborative work may engender other options





# Notification Timing Issue

Timing of Checkout


- ISOs will schedule Physical interchange
- Physical schedule does not require Part. checkout
- Timing of Part. Financial checkout to be reviewed
  - Holds potential for reduced notification times





# Notification Timing Issue

Timing of Checkout Without VRD







# ISOs Schedule VRD Energy to *approach* price convergence Conservative VRD

Avoid consequences of over scheduling

Sellers' price always > buyers' price

or

Real-time congestion charges

# Risk of over booking (by Participants) when physical direction is predictable.





	<u>NY</u>	<u>NE</u>
Net D. A. Part. Interchange	100 mw	<b>→</b>
ISO Physical interchange	300 mw	<b>→</b>
LMP/LBMP (Post VRD)	40\$/mw	45\$/mw

(Same conditions used in earlier example)





	<u>NY</u>	<u>NE</u>
Net D. A. Part. Interchange	100 MW	<b>→</b>
ISO Physical interchange	300 MW	<b>→</b>
LMP/LBMP (Post VRD)	40\$/MW	45\$/MW

#### **Participant**

Real time additions 1,500 MW  $\rightarrow$  Settlements R.T. (1,500 mw) \* (\$5/MW) = \$7,500





# **The \$7,500 example**

- Incentive for participants to schedule large financial transactions
  - Direction of flow is predictable +
  - ISOs set physical flow to create small price separation (could potentially remain large, if interface is congested)





#### **Options:**

- Limitations on Real-time bidding quantities
- Introduce a Real-time congestion charge
  - Real-time FTRs for Real-time Transactions
  - Similar to Real time Bi-lateral arrangements
- Other





# Scarcity Pricing Issue

- VRD will reduce incidence of scarcity pricing
- However, whenever market prices are being set under Scarcity Pricing agreements
  - Prices may not reflect location of most efficient resource
  - Alternate VRD scheduling will need to be considered





#### Additional Issues

- Dispatch of Controllable lines
- Details of charging Out-service on VRD transactions if Out-service is retained
- Regulation, Operating Reserve, etc.
  - Participant transactions still subject to these charges
- Operational procedures





# End of Slides for Agenda Item 5

SUBSTANTIVE SETTLEMENTS ISSUES DISCUSSION