

Enhancements to the ICAP and Energy Forecasts in the Buyer-side Mitigation Rules

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Objectives

Continue discussion on developing rules to enhance BSM forecasts:

- Under the current rules, units that have exited the markets for various reasons and that might not re-enter service are modeled as "in-service."
 - Assumptions on in-service MW are important for revenue forecasts

Address Stakeholders' Suggestions

- Forecasts performed by independent 3rd party
- Adjustments to BSM assumptions on LCR



Current Rule

- Mothballed ("MO") and ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage ("IIFO") Units*
 - "Expected Retirements"** are the only units excluded from the BSM forecasts.
 - All Mothballed & ICAP Ineligible Forced Out Units are included in BSM forecasts.

^{*} The terms Mothballed and IIFO are part of a tariff proposal pending before FERC. As used herein, these phrases are used to indicate units that have the same characteristics of units that meet those general definitions.

^{**}Attachment H definition of "Expected Retirements" (Sec. 23.4.5.7) includes only units that have provided a written retirement notice to the PSC.



Proposed Framework

Core Principles:

- Sound economic principles
- Market rule transparency
- Predictability for stakeholders
- Enables timely application
- Consistency with related NYISO processes
- Modify and clarify existing rule
 - Change current rule for evaluating whether and when MO & IIFO units should be included in BSM Forecasts



ICAP Ineligible and Mothballed Units



Potential Design Concepts considered (1)

- Historical Average MW aggregated by Locality
 - Backward-looking approach
 - Inflexible
 - Potential over/under estimation
- Predefined Class-average Going Forward Costs
 - Some technologies might appear to be less profitable
 - Tracking individual units to aggregate them into classes
 - Controversy from defining "class-average" unit (i.e., age, geography, markets, fuel diversity)
 - A reasonable computation suitable for the purpose may not be readily available



Potential Design Concepts considered (2)

- Unit Specific Going Forward Costs
 - Confidentiality concerns
 - No transparency to the market place
 - A reasonable computation suitable for the purpose may not be readily available
- ICAP Eligibility Category
 - Situational
 - Inflexible
 - Potential over/under estimation
- Methodology based on Market signals, e.g., ICAP Market-Clearing Prices
 - Transparent to market place
 - Straightforward implementation and replicability
 - Supported by economic theory
 - No issues with disclosure of confidential information



Proposed Rule

- Include in the Capacity and Energy Forecasts if:
 - Forced Outage
 - ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage (if there are positive indications of repairs *)
 - Partial long-term derate (if there are positive indications of repair and intent to return **)
 - Noticed Intent to Return from Mothball (if there are positive indications that the unit will be returning***)
- Do not Include in the Capacity and Energy Forecasts if:
 - Retired
 - Relinquishing/Transferring CRIS

^{*} Positive indications that a unit will be returning to service include: A) indications of repair evidenced by items such as: 1) A repair plan including schedule, 2) A list of permits required with indications of active status, 3) Invoices for material, 4) Contracts for construction; or B) indications of restart including such items as: 1) Visible site activity, 2) labor arrangements, 2) fuel supply arrangements, 3) unit testing.

^{**} See above

^{***} i.e., DNMC test



Proposed Rule cont'd

- Include in the Capacity Forecasts at "price level":
 - ICAP Ineligible Forced Outage (unless there are positive indications of repair *)
 - Mothball Outage
 - Noticed Intent to Return from Mothball (until status changed)
 - Noticed Intent to Mothball or Retire (until status changed)

^{*} Positive indications that a unit will be returning to service include: A) indications of repair evidenced by items such as: 1) A repair plan including schedule, 2) A list of permits required with indications of active status, 3) Invoices for material, 4) Contracts for construction; or B) indications of restart including such items as: 1) Visible site activity, 2) labor arrangements, 2) fuel supply arrangements, 3) unit testing.



Forecast Price Level

- "Price Level" reflects:
 - ICAP Spot Auction Market-Clearing Prices (by Locality)
 - Average ICAP Spot Market-Clearing Price of the last two Capability Periods in which a unit offered into the Spot
 - Average ICAP Spot Market-Clearing Prices of the immediately preceding completed Capability Period and the Capability Period at the time of the BSM evaluation.
 - Incentive to withhold
 - Portfolio test (by Locality)
 - Optimal price level at which MO or IIFO MW maximize revenue of a portfolio
 - Effect on Market-Clearing Prices (by Locality)
 - Once a unit returns, all other things being equal, MCP will be lower
 - Risk adder



Example: Price Level Calculation

- Class Year 2015
 - Mitigation Study Period May 2018 through April 2021
 - For the purpose of this example, BSM determination issued March 2016
- Assume the Demand Curve slope is \$1.1/kW-Mon per 100 MW
- Assume 150 MW of a mothballed unit in New York City
 - \$1.65 + 10% = \$1.82 = adder need to counter effect of absence of mothballed MW, for instance 10%
- Assume 1,300 MW of Gold Book based portfolio (by ICAP Supplier)
 - Portfolio Hurdle Rate = \$14.3
- Assume, the unit went to mothball outage status Summer 2014
 - \$14.12 → average ICAP Spot Market-Clearing Price for Winter 13/14 and Summer 14
- Assume Average of the ICAP Spot MCP for May 2015 through April 2016
 - **\$15**
- Price Level = max{\$14.12, \$15+\$1.82, \$14.3} = \$16.82



Responses to Stakeholder Suggestions during previous ICAPWG presentation

- NYISO received feedback at the December 12, 2014 presentation
- The following two slides are for further discussion
- The NYISO is committed to developing a process to facilitate the discussion of proposed enhancements to the assumptions and methods used in the BSM determinations
 - This process will be discussed at upcoming meetings



ICAP Forecast performed by 3rd party

Pros:

 It has been suggested this may be more representative of a competitive supplier outlook

Cons:

- Increased level of uncertainly due to unknown assumptions
- All assumptions might not be transparent
- No indication that assumptions would be more appropriate than those used in an stakeholder-developed rule
- 3rd party forecasters often represent Market Participants and developers, and thus may have conflicts of interest
- Additional costs to the NYISO



Adjusted LCR vs. Currently approved LCR

Pros:

- May capture impact of Class Year projects
- Potential alignment with NYISO planning assumptions for MSP and with Load Forecast assumptions

Cons:

- LCR model has short-term outlook compared to the ICAP forecast for the purpose of the BSM determinations
- Complexity added to the process
- Would be cumbersome because LCR would need to be revised as projects drop out of the Class Year before its completion
- Additional time and resources
- Simplified assumptions may introduce additional inaccuracy and bias




Next Steps

- The NYISO will consider input received during today's ICAPWG meeting
- Stakeholders can also provide additional comments in writing to deckels@nyiso.com
- Further review of the proposal at a future ICAPWG meeting



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