



Virtual Regional Dispatch Adding Real-time Cross Border Financial Rights To the Proposed Design

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Why Cross Border Hedge (CBH)

- A Participant requested <u>Cross Border Hedges</u> (CBH) to be included in the VRD proposal
 - ✓ High level presentation made to NEPOOL Committee structure
- The CBH proposal is not simply an expansion of the Virtual Regional Dispatch straw proposal.
 - ✓ It offers solutions to outstanding issues.

Note: Today's presentation has added detail to original high level presentation





Features of CBH

- Consistent with VRD objectives of improving the efficiency of regional dispatch.
- Suggests a method for distributing benefits of ISOscheduled VRD transactions.
- Adds Real-time cross border hedging opportunity to VRD proposal.





Design Considerations

- The VRD/CBH design needs to:
 - ✓ Retain the ability to fully hedge transactions scheduled Day-Ahead.
 - ✓ Accommodate Exit fees if they are not removed.
 - ✓ Provide mechanism for fully funding Exit fees for intervals when VRD dispatch fails to preserve adequate proxy bus price separation.





Design Summary (1 of 2)

- After close of DAM, the ISOs publish Real-time transfer capability (net of Day Ahead Schedules).
- Financial rights to Real-time transfer capability are auctioned.
- Auction Revenues are distributed.





Design Summary (2 of 2)

- Participant R. T. Transactions that are not hedged in DAM and VRD transactions pay cross border congestion (proxy bus differential).
- CBH holders receive benefits of cross border congestion charges.

(adjusted for any exit fees.)





CBH Design Activities (1 of 4)

- The New York and New England DAM is posted (no proposed changes).
- 2. Transactions clearing in both markets are identified.
- 3. Transfer capability not scheduled in DAMs are posted on WEB.
 - Becomes available for CBH bidding.

(late afternoon following the close of the NEPOOL DAM .)





CBH Design Activities (2 of 4)

- 4. The Market bids for financial rights to cross border price separation for available R.T. Transfer capacity.
 - Very similar to DAM TCC and FTR but -
 - ✓ Bidding is for CBH in only one direction.
 - ✓ Value of CBH is determined by the Real-time proxy bus price separation in the direction of *purchase*.
 - Never a charge.
 - Subject to collection of exit fees.





CBH Design Activities (3 of 4)

5. Market clears, results are posted.

Timeline estimates (open for discussion)

• Transfer Capability posted: 17:00

◆ Auction bidding Window: 17:00 – 20:00

Market Cleared and posted: 21:00





CBH Design Activities (4 of 4)

- 6. Real-Time Settlements:
 - Collects cross border congestion from Realtime transactions including VRD.
 - Pays exit fees out of collected revenues.
 - Pays balance to CBH auction winners.





Design Features (1 of 4)

- Retains ability for transactions scheduled Day-Ahead to be fully hedged.
- Provisions for collection of Exit fees.
- Day-ahead Transactions (in both DAMs) delivered in Real-time continue to pay the Exit fees.
- CBH holders are never charged for holding a CBH.





Design Features (2 of 4)

- Real time transactions (not delivery of DAM obligations)
 pay/receive Proxy bus price difference to/from
 CBH/VRD Fund.
- T.O.s receive exit fees based upon net scheduled physical flow.





Design Features (3 of 4)

- CBH to fully fund Exit fees
- Full funding of exit fees and any counterintuitive
 VRD physical schedule can result in under funding of
 CBH financial rights.
 - Example later in presentation to show condition of under funding.





Design features (4 of 4)

- Hours with insufficient revenue to pay T.O.s or hours with counterintuitive physical scheduling will reduce daily payout to CBH auction winners.
- Should daily revenues collected be insufficient to cover daily sum of exit fees:
 - ✓ Could under fund exit fees
 - ✓ Could design an allocation





Allocation of Auction Revenue

- Direction-specific Cross Border Hedge financial rights are auctioned.
- Auction revenues retained within control area (market) selling CBH rights for exports.
- Selling market is to decide details of allocation.





Participants Fully schedule Interface

Example 1

Market Conditions

- ✓ NE selling to NY
- ✓ Interface Transfer limit = 600 mw
- √ 500 mw of DAM transactions schedule in R.T.
- √ 100 mw of participant Real time Transaction scheduled
- \checkmark Exit fee = 5 \$/mwh

CBH Settlements

✓ CBH holders receive benefit of price separation on congested interface.





Example 1	CBH Hedge with Real time Congestion			
	Participants fill interchange with transactions			
Market Data		NY Market Data	ma	NE arket Oata
Real time Deliveries	of DAM Obligations (mwh)	-500	←	500
Real time transaction		-100	•	100
Virtual Dispatch Phys	cal Schedule (mwh)	0		0
Physical Interchange		-600		600
Locational prices		60		45
Exit fee \$		5		5
Virtual Dispa	tch Settlement with CBH			
Real time Tra	insaction Payment of Congestion 100* (60-45)	\$1,500		
DAM market	payment Exit fees (500*5)	\$2,500		
CBH Paymer	nt to Auction winners 100 * ((60-45)-5)	(\$1,000)		
TOs receipt	(\$3,000)			
	NET	\$0		





VRD Schedules Interface to Full Capacity

Example 2

- Market Data
 - ✓ Same as example 1 other than:
 - Participant Real time transaction replaced by VRD transaction

- CBH Settlements
 - ✓ CBH holders receive same benefits as in example 1.





Example 2	CBH H	edge with	Real time Congestion	<u>ı</u>		
	Virtual Dis	patch Incremer	ntally loads interchange to limit			
Market Data				NY Market Data		<u>NE</u> market Data
Real time Deliveries of	of DAM Obliga	ations (mwh)		-500	<u></u>	500
VRD incremental Scho				-100	-	100
Virtual Dispatch Physi	cal Schedule	e (mwh)		0	•	C
Physical Interchange				-600		600
Locational prices				60		45
Exit fee \$				5		5
Virtual Dispa						
VRD Schedu	le Paym	ent of Co	ngestion 100* (60-45)	\$1,500		
DAM market	paymer	nt Exit fee	s (500*5)	\$2,500		
CBH Paymen	t to Auc	tion winn	ers 100 * ((60-45)-5)	(\$1,000)		
TOs receipt o	of Exit fe	es (600 *	5)	(\$3,000)		
			NET	\$0	_	





Hour of Insufficient Revenue for T.O.s

Example 3

Market Data

- ✓ Similar to example 2 other than
 - Interface scheduling not limited by transfer limit
 - Hourly prices ended up being closer than Exit fees
 - Insufficient revenues to pay the T.O.s

CBH Settlements

- ✓ Negative CBH benefits are set to zero
- ✓ Deficit in revenue to pay T.O.s (Collection to be distributed to CBH holders across the day)





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Example B	Proxy Bus Pri	ices Closed to less than	Exit Fees	
				NE
			NY Market	market
Market Data			Data	Data
<u>iviai ket Data</u>			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Real time Deliveries of D)	-500 ←	
VRD incremental Schedu			-100 ←	_ 100
Virtual Dispatch Physical	Schedule (mwh)		0	
Physical Interchange			-600	600
Locational prices			60	59
Exit fee \$			5	
Virtual Dispatc	h Settlement	with CRH		
virtual Dispate	<u> 11 Settlement</u>	WILLI COLL		
VRD Schedule	Payment of C	Congestion 100* (60-59)	\$100	
DAM market pa	ayment Exit fe	ees (500*5)	\$2,500	
	1 . A . 12	400 + ((00 50) 5)	0.0	
CBH Payment	to Auction wir	nners 100 * ((60-59)-5)	\$0	
TOs receipt of	Exit fees (600) * 5)	<u>(\$3,000)</u>	
		NET	(\$400)	
CBH hol	ders never pay	y when benefit is negative		
		H payments across day a	re reduced	





Summary

- The CBH proposal is consistent with the objectives of VRD.
- CBH offers solutions to issues that were outstanding in previously released Straw Proposal.
- CBH warrants full consideration as the details of the virtual dispatch package are developed.



