

ATTACHMENT C

**FORMULAS FOR DETERMINING MINIMUM GENERATION AND START-UP
 AND CURTAILMENT INITIATION COST PAYMENTS**

I. Supplemental Payments to Generators

~~Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment = Day-Ahead Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment + Real-Time Market Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment;~~ There are three supplemental payments described in this attachment: i) Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee; ii) Real-Time Bid Production Guarantee for all intervals except Maximum Generation Pickups and Large Event Reserve Pickups; and iii) Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantees for Maximum Generation Pickups and Large Event Reserve Pickups.

A. Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee ~~Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment~~

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Day-Ahead Bid Production Cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[\sum_{i=1}^{24} \left(\int_{MGH_{gi}^{DA}}^{EH_{gi}^{DA}} C_{gi}^{DA} + MGC_{gi}^{DA} MGH_{gi}^{DA} + SUC_{gi}^{DA} NSUH_{gi}^{DA} - LBMP_{gi}^{DA} EH_{gi}^{DA} - NASR_{gi}^{DA} \right), 0 \right]$$

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[\sum_{h=1}^{24} \left(\int_{MGH_{gh}^{DA}}^{EH_{gh}^{DA}} C_{gh}^{DA} + MGC_{gh}^{DA} MGH_{gh}^{DA} + SUC_{gh}^{DA} NSUH_{gh}^{DA} - LBMP_{gh}^{DA} EH_{gh}^{DA} - NASR_{gh}^{DA} \right), 0 \right]$$

~~Real-Time Market Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment =~~

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\int_{EI_g^{RT}}^{EI_g^{RT}} C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} - RRAC_{gi} \right), 0 \right]$$

Where:

- G = set of Generators;
- EH_{gh}^{DA} = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by Generator g in hour h; expressed in terms of MW;
- MGH_{gh}^{DA} = Energy scheduled Day-Ahead to be produced by minimum generation segment of Generator g in hour h; expressed in terms of MW;
- C_{gh}^{DA} = Bid cost curve made by Generator g in the Day-Ahead Market for-hour h; expressed in terms of \$/MWh;

- $MGC_{gh_i}^{DA}$ = Minimum Generation Bid by Generator g for hour h_i in the Day-Ahead Market, expressed in terms of \$/MW;
- $SUC_{gh_i}^{DA}$ = Start-Up Bid by Generator g in hour h_i into Day-Ahead Market expressed in terms of \$/start;
- $NSUH_{gh_i}^{DA}$ = number of times Generator g is scheduled Day-Ahead to start up in hour h_i ;
- $LBMP_{gh_i}^{DA}$ = Day-Ahead LBMP at Generator g's bus in hour h_i expressed in terms of \$/MWh;
- ~~N = number of RTD intervals in 24-hour day;~~
- ~~EI_{gi}^{RT} = metered Energy produced by Generator g in RTD interval i, up to a maximum of the arithmetic average of the 6-second AGC Basepoint Signals sent to the Generator over the RTD interval;~~
- ~~EI_{gi}^{DA} = Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Market to be produced by Generator g in RTD interval i;~~

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$NASR_{gh_i}^{DA}$ = Net Ancillary Services revenue, **expressed in terms of \$**, paid to Generator g as a result of having been committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day- Ahead to operate in hour h is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support payments received by that Generator for that hour, if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity and has been scheduled to operate in that hour; (2) Regulation Service payments made to that Generator for all Regulation Service it is scheduled Day-Ahead to provide in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide that amount of Regulation Service in that hour (unless the Bid exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service that was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services Day- Ahead, in which case this component shall be zero); and (3) payments made to that Generator for providing synchronized Operating Reserves in that hour if it is committed Day- Ahead to provide synchronized Operating Reserve in that hour, less that Generator's Day-Ahead Bid to provide synchronized Operating Reserve in that hour. **(Note to MSWG Members: The NYISO is open to suggestions that this variable should encompass all Operating Reserves instead of all synchronized Operating Reserves.)**

B. Real-Time Bid Production Guarantee for all intervals except Maximum Generation Pickups and Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Bid Production cost Guarantee =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \max \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\left(\frac{EI_{gi}^{RT}}{EI_{gi}^{DA}} \left(C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) * \frac{s}{3600} \right) - (NASR_{gi}^{TOT} - NASR_{gi}^{DA}) - RRAP_{gi} + RRAC_{gi} \right], 0 \right]$$

where:

$NASR_{gi}^{TOT}$ = Net Ancillary Services scheduled revenue paid to Generator g as a result of either having been committed Day-Ahead to operate in hour i that includes RTD interval i or having operated in interval i is computed by summing the following: (1) Voltage Support payments received by that Generator for that RTD interval i , if it is not a Supplier of Installed Capacity; (2) Regulation Service payments that would be made to that Generator for that hour based on a Performance Index of 1, less the Bid(s) placed by that Generator to provide Regulation Service in that hour at the time it was committed to produce Energy for the LBMP Market and/or Ancillary Services to do so (unless the Bid(s) exceeds the payments that Generator receives for providing Regulation Service, in which case this component shall be zero); (3) payments made to that Generator for providing synchronized Operating Reserve in that hour, less the Bid placed by that Generator to provide synchronized Operating Reserve in that hour at the time it was scheduled to do so; and (4) Lost Opportunity Cost payments made to that Generator in that hour as a result of reducing that Generator's output in order for it to provide Voltage Support Service. **(Note: Same Comment as for DA Net Ancillary Services.)**

$RRAP_{gi}$ = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Payment for Generator g in RTD interval i expressed in terms of \$.

$RRAC_{gi}$ = Regulation Revenue Adjustment Charge for Generator g in RTD interval i expressed in terms of \$.

Time periods including reserve pickups, and time periods following a reserve pickup in which the dispatch of a given Generator is constrained by its downward ramp rate, will not be included in the above calculation of supplemental payments for that Generator.

Supplemental payments to Generators that trip before completing their minimum run-time (for Generators that were not scheduled to run Day-Ahead) or before running for the number of hours they were scheduled to operate (for Generators scheduled to run Day-Ahead) may be reduced by the ISO, per ISO Procedures.

Penalty charges resulting from failure to provide an Ancillary Service will not be taken into account when calculating supplemental payments for that Supplier.

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C. Real-Time Bid Production Cost Guarantees for Maximum Generation Pickups and Large Event Reserve Pickups

Real-Time Market Minimum Generation and Start-Up Payment =

$$\sum_{g \in G} \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \max \left(\left(\int_{EI_{gi}^{DA}}^{EI_{gi}^{RT}} C_{gi}^{RT} + MGC_{gi}^{RT} (MGI_{gi}^{RT} - MGI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) + SUC_{gi}^{RT} (NSUI_{gi}^{RT} - NSUI_{gi}^{DA}) - LBMP_{gi}^{RT} (EI_{gi}^{RT} - EI_{gi}^{DA}) \right) * \frac{s}{3600} \right), 0 \right]$$

where:

N = number of Maximum Generation Pickups or Large Event Reserve Pickups in the 24 hour day;

All other variables are the same as those defined in section I.B.

II. Supplemental Payments for Curtailment Initiation Costs

A Supplemental payment for Curtailment Initiation Costs shall be made when the Curtailment Initiation Cost Bid and the Demand Reduction Bid price for any Demand Reduction committed by the ISO in the Day-Ahead market over the twenty-four (24) hour day exceeds Day-Ahead LBMP revenue, provided however that Supplemental payments made to Demand Reduction Providers that fail to complete their scheduled reductions may be reduced by the ISO, pursuant to ISO Procedures.

III. Supplemental Payments for Special Case Resources

A Supplemental payment for Minimum Payment Nominations shall be made when the Minimum Payment Nomination for any Special Case Resource committed by the ISO during a Forecast Operating Reserve shortage exceeds the LBMP revenue received for performance by that Special Case Resource.

Generators with start-up times of greater than twenty-four (24) hours will have their Start-Up Bids equally prorated over the course of each day included in their start-up period. Consequently, units whose start-ups are aborted will receive a prorated portion of those payments, based on the portion of the start-up sequence they have completed (e.g., if a unit with a seventy-two (72) hour start-up time has its start-up sequence aborted after forty-eight (48) hours, it would receive two-thirds (2/3) of its start-up cost Bid).

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Sheet Nos. 425 through 426 are reserved for future use.

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